Visitó cuatro veces al embajador de EE.UU. Proyectaba una imagen moderada, pero abría puertas a los radicales
id: 230714
date: 10/21/2009 20:13
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001561
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, SNAR, PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA: HEDGING BETS IN RUN UP TO ELECTIONS
REF: A. LIMA 637 B. 05 LIMA 4132 C. 05 LIMA 4854
Classified By: Amb P. Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Opposition leader Ollanta Humala — who
nearly won the 2006 presidential elections on a populist
platform — heads a Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) pursuing
an ambiguous dual-track political path. According to
insiders, the party continues to have “one foot inside and
the other foot outside” of the formal political system, and
several factions have been fighting over which path to choose
in the run up to regional and national elections. Humala’s
decision to create some level of association with radical
groups has resulted in one recent high-level defection from
the party so far. Whatever his final tack, Humala is likely
to be in the presidential mix in 2011 — unless Peru’s latent
mass of disenchanted voters find someone they believe better
suited to bear the anti-system flag. End Summary.
One Foot In, the Other Out
—————————————
2. (C) Opposition leader Ollanta Humala — who nearly won
the 2006 presidential elections on a populist platform —
heads a Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) in search of its
true identity. The party has swung between opposing
approaches since its inception, seeking to make itself
broadly palatable by assuming moderate positions and
eschewing open talk of radical measures while also
maintaining its credentials as an anti-system group dedicated
to profound “nationalist” reform (refs B and C.) In a
conversation with the Ambassador earlier this year, Humala
suggested he was keeping his options open and quietly
coordinating with radical groups (ref A). Nadine Heredia,
Humala’s wife and advisor and a key PNP leader, told us more
recently that the party continues to have “one foot inside
and the other foot outside” of the formal political system,
describing the party’s vigorous work within Congress and its
willingness, as necessary, to assume more radical positions
to oppose what she characterized as Peru’s corrupt and unjust
social and political order.
Infighting Over Approach
————————————
3. (C) Several party factions have been fighting over which
path to choose in the run up to the 2010 regional elections
and the subsequent national elections in 2011. Publicly,
this dispute has centered over the PNP’s reported effort to
forge a broad left-of-center coalition, and include radical
fringe groups such as Patria Roja, (MRTA front organization)
Patria Libre and others in it. Humala himself has made
public statements indicating an interest in working with any
group that “wants to change the country.” According to some
reports, Humala has made a political decision to maintain (at
a minimum) some level of association with radical groups,
reportedly opening a “frente amplio” office in a Lima suburb
and holding periodic meetings, even though he recently
publicly denied any intention to form an electoral agreement
with these groups. Some PNP leaders, including Congressman
Daniel Abugattas, have argued that bringing radical groups
into the PNP tent gives them leverage they would otherwise
lack, and undermines the party’s authority and leadership.
Abugattas” advisors told us recently that Humala had already
been pressured into taking several controversial public
positions as a result of this dynamic, which had damaged the
party’s image.
4. (C) Nadine Heredia told us the PNP talks to “everyone,”
and was open to alliances with other groups on the left. She
underscored that one important exception to this rule was
Sendero Luminoso, which the PNP rejected and against whom her
husband had fought as an Army officer at the height of the
terrorist insurgency. According to news and other reports,
the return as a close advisor to the party of longtime
leftist ideologue Carlos Tapia, who had reportedly distanced
himself from Humala after the 2006 election loss, was one of
the driving forces behind the PNP’s move to forge alliances
with all comers, including those on the radical fringe. That
a former staffer to PNP Congresswoman and cocalero leader
Nancy Obregon’s was recently caught transporting 140 kilos of
cocaine suggests the party’s radical associations extend to
drug-trafficking (vice mere coca growing) interests as well.
5. (C) Another factor in Humala’s dual strategy relates to
electoral strategy. According to party insiders, to avoid a
collapse similar to that of the 2006 regional and municipal
elections (in which the PNP fared poorly), Humala has chosen
to field candidates in the 2010 regional elections that fly
under a non-PNP banner as “regional fronts.” At the same
time, the party plans to maintain a loose association with
these fronts, hence the reaching out. The reasoning behind
this strategy, insiders say, is that the PNP will be able to
claim victory if “its” candidates win, and thereby gain
momentum in the approach to 2011, while avoiding too close an
association with candidates who lose, which could hamper the
PNP’s national aspirations.
High-Level Defection
——————————
6. (C) Internal dissent over the PNP’s approach has resulted
in one recent high-level defection from the party so far,
that of Congressman Isaac Mekler. After publicly questioning
what he called the party’s dangerous association with radical
actors, Mekler formally bolted from the party in early
October, declaring himself a political independent.
Following the break, Mekler accused Humala of having been
induced by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez into an
association with such groups as the New Left (Nueva
Izquierda), the Socialist Party, Patria Libre and other
fringe groups. Mekler’s follows the earlier defections of
other former Humala allies, most of whom left the PNP fold
immediately after the 2006 elections. Whether rooted in real
ideological disagreements or simple personal interests, it
could also presage more departures in the future. For
example, we have heard that indigenous leaders within the PNP
have also grown restive and some, chafing under the party’s
autocratic leadership and claiming Humala has sought to use
them politically while giving them little in return, are
considering breaking ties with the party and throwing their
support to alternative candidates.
Humala in the Mix
————————-
7. (C) Internal tensions notwithstanding, Humala is likely
to be in the presidential mix in 2011. More than any other
prominent political figure, he continues most fully to embody
the “political opposition” for most Peruvians; and, while
notoriously fickle, poll numbers consistently place him among
the top 5 candidates for president in 2011. In addition, the
PNP is one of the few political parties with a national
structure, and probably the only one (apart from theFujimoristas) with an active political network in Peru’s
impoverished rural communities — a significant electoral
advantage.
Comment: Competing for Anti-System Vote
———————————————————-
8. (C) Not alone in the anti-system wild, other candidates
are likely to compete with Humala over Peru’s overlapping
nationalist, leftist, opposition political turf. These could
include Congresswoman Keiko Fujimori (daughter of the former
President), former Prime Minister Yehude Simon, and
anti-mining activist and Catholic priest, Padre Marco Arana,
who has already formed his “Tierra y Libertad” political
party. In our recent conversation with her, Nadine Heredia’s
dismissive attitude toward Humala’s potential political
rivals struck us as thinly veiled concern about having to
compete for the political space that became her husband’s
alone in 2006. Finally, if Peru’s recent electoral past is
precedent, the prospect of a previously little known,
last-minute candidate surging to occupy the anti-system
segment of Peru’s political spectrum — a la Fujimori in
1990, Toledo in 2001 and Humala himself in 2006 — can hardly
be ruled out. This historical pattern also explains Humala’s
strategy of keeping at least one foot outside a system in
which a still significant percentage of Peru’s voters have
little faith.
MCKINLEY
===================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 114649
date: 7/6/2007 23:31
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002323
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PE, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREL, SNAR
SUBJECT: OLLANTA HUMALA – THE BENEFITS OF SOCIAL UNREST
REF: A. LIMA 2000 B. LIMA 2009 C. LIMA 2126 D. LIMA 2236
Classified By: Classified By: A/DCM V. Wunder, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Struble paid a cordial
farewell call on Ollanta Humala, president of the
Nationalist Party of Peru (PNP) on July 3. Humala said
the Garcia administration’s indifference to Peru’s social
problems was causing mounting unrest in the country.
Humala noted his growing alliance with striking workers,
protesting regional defense fronts and other frustrated
Peruvians, predicting he would soon lead a broad-based
political movement in favor of his goal of radical change.
The nationalist leader said it would be bad for the country
if Garcia were pushed out of office early, but the
President was risking such an outcome by turning his
back on electoral promises. Humala admitted his party
had experienced growing pains. He lamented the
coalition with the UPP and said his nationalists had no
interest in proposals by the center-right Unidad Nacional
for opposition control of the Congress. Reflecting a
continued anti-systemic outlook, Humala said he would
not hesitate to walk away from the nationalist
Congressional bloc if they discredit his movement. He
expressed concern that his reputation had become
entangled with the fate of Puno regional President
Fuentes because of the latter’s strong embrace of Hugo
Chavez. Humala said he was trying to rally leftist
support for Fuentes and to advise the regional president,
but was uncertain whether he would succeed.
(Ambassador’s comment: Humala exuded an excited
belief that things are moving his way. Many of the
movements now flocking to him, however, are
opportunists angling for a deal. I expect many of them
will be peeled off by the GOP in coming weeks. Humala
retains most of the advantages he brought to last year’s
strong electoral showing — confidence, conviction,
charm, credibility with the poor and a handsome dark
face in a country where most national leaders look
unmistakably European. He also, however, is still
burdened with the same disadvantages. Those include a
military-molded personality that demands complete
obedience and eschews compromise, association with the
locally unpopular Hugo Chavez, and a certain naivet,
about the motives of some who rally to his banner. End
Comment.) End Summary.
—————————————
The Cause of Social Unrest
—————————————
2. (C) Ambassador Struble met with Ollanta Humala and
his wife Nadine Heredia, the PNP’s head of international
relations, for one hour on July 3. The tone of the meeting
was cordial and open. Humala said social tensions in
Peru’s interior are rising, prompted by the recognition that
the GOP is unable — or perhaps unwilling — to fulfill
campaign promises to address the social crisis in the
countryside. Little had been done, for example, to fix
crumbling roads, reform corrupt courts, or address Peru’s
twin problems of discrimination and exclusion.
According to Humala, the GOP had focused instead on
advancing the narrow self-interests of the ruling elite; in
the words of Heredia, the governing party “was not
Aprista but Alanista.” Ollanta said that it would not be
good for Peru if Garcia were forced out of the Presidency
short of term. However, Humala seemed to believe that
Garcia was doomed to fall unless he changed his ways.
3. (C) Humala cited congressional approval of the PTPA
as an example of how the GOP pandered to the rich. Free
trade, he argued, benefited only a portion of Peruvian
society and created hardships for small agricultural
producers. The treaty, moreover, lacked legitimacy in
Peru because it was passed without public debate and was
the creation of a party — former president Toledo’s Peru
Possible — that had practically ceased to exist.
4. (C) Humala saw public frustration at the gap between
governmental rhetoric and reality as the fuel for a
growing number of protests throughout Peru, with
historically inarticulate groups — workers, campesinos,
and indigenous communities — forming for the first time
coalitions across regional, ethnic, and economic lines. In
the midst of this ferment, PNP party members were
working at the district level to shape a common agenda
that would unite protesters into a broad-based political
movement. For Humala, GOP dithering in addressing
social problems in the mountains and in the jungles was
creating an army of potential recruits for the PNP.
Nadine Heredia noted that political observers had made
much of Humala’s failure to win regional presidencies in
the November 2006 regional/municipal elections. She
suggested that the various regional “defense fronts”
leading strikes and protests now underway in the jungle
and highlands represented popular power. They were
seeking out Humala, as were some regional Presidents,
the striking miners in Casaplaca and other aggrieved
groups. She predicted that they would coalesce into a
new national opposition led by Humala. Both Ollanta
and Nadine were visibly excited by these strikes and
protests
————————————-
The Problem of Governance
————————————-
5. (C) Humala admitted that organizing and
administering a national political party was hard work,
and he said that “criticizing is one thing, managing
another,” as evidenced by the fate of fellow radical
Hernan Fuentes, regional president of Puno. Humala said
Fuentes faced stiff challenges in delivering good
government in Puno — a lack of talented technocrats,
regional infighting, and a restive and extremist Aymara
community — but Fuentes had made the situation worse.
Though Fuentes was not elected on the PNP banner,
Humala admitted that nationalists would be tarnished
by the Puno President’s failure; Fuentes strong embrace
of Bolivarianism (reftels A and D) and Hugo Chavez led
many people to identify him with Ollanta. (Humala said
that his own identification with Chavez was exaggerated,
though he added that he admires the Venezuelan leader
and considers him a friend.) Humala said that he would
soon meet with Fuentes to advise that he spend more time
fixing broken public services. Humala had also called
Jose Quintana, who lost to Fuentes by only one
percentage point, to urge that he help Fuentes in the name
of leftist solidarity; there was too much bad blood
between the men, though, and a rapprochement seemed
impossible.
6. (C) Humala said that the PNP erred by aligning with
the Union for Peru (UPP) after the 2006 elections. The
UPP was better organized and more experienced than the
PNP and represented both groups in the Congress”
governing body. UPP used those advantages to mislead
and betray the PNP, pushing the nationalist agenda to the
side. Relations were much better now that the parties had
ended their formal coalition. As a result of the earlier
experience, Humala said, he was completely disinterested
in proposals by the center-right Unidad Nacional that the
opposition form a joint slate to take the Presidency of
Congress. What do we have in common with Unidad
Nacional?, he asked rhetorically. Humala recognized that
the PNP could fall prey to the same public discontent
directed at the traditional parties and said he would not
hesitate to walk away from his deputies if they discredit
the movement. All the same, he argued that only the PNP
offered a genuine ideological choice within the Peruvian
Congress and predicted that the PNP’s focus on grass-
roots organization would prevent his party from ignoring
broad sectors of the society.
————————————
Radicalism not Extremism
————————————
7. (SBU) Humala characterized himself as a radical, but
not an extremist, defining the two terms as follows: A
radical believes the status quo is unjust but offers
concrete proposals to remedy the situation. An extremist
likewise believes society is unjust, but only tears down
and does not seek to build up. Ollanta reiterated his
support for free elections and democracy. He said he had
a positive political program that sought, for example, to
redefine the relationship between the state and foreign
capital and to promote economic development — as long
as regulations protecting the environment and the rights
of workers were enforced. In his view, the GOP’s
counter-narcotics program needed to be redesigned to
find markets for legal coca, a solution that would
undercut the appeal of both the Shining Path and narco-
traffickers. If those kinds of reforms were not made,
extremist groups — who oppose any kind of economic
development — would grow stronger. Humala
maintained that he was not anti-US — though he opposed
aspects of US policy — and that he recognized the
preeminent role the US plays in Latin America.
8. (SBU) Comment: Humala’s sweeping analysis of
Peruvian politics sometimes stumbled over facts. The
Ambassador pointed out, for example, that the PTPA had
been debated extensively in congressional committees.
Humala’s claim that regional protests are coalescing also
is suspect and ignores both the wide difference over goals
in disparate social movements and the government’s
success in addressing local complaints (see septel).
Humala’s endorsement of electoral democracy was
welcome, but there may be more than a little opportunism
in his stance: many observes suspect he has already been
eclipsed in the nationalist movement by his brother
Antuaro, whose political platform is racist, violent, and
anti-democratic (reftels B and C). The Humala family
remains an important force within Peru’s radical left, and
the Humalas have shown a willingness to talk to Embassy
officials. Post plans to continue to take advantage of their
garrulousness. End Comment.
STRUBLE
===================CABLE ENDS============================
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————————- header ends ————————
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002017
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, PE
SUBJECT: PDAS SHAPIRO/AMBASSADOR MEET WITH HUMALA
Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (U) Visiting PDAS Charles Shapiro and Ambassador Struble
met for one hour on May 17 with nationalist Presidential
candidate Ollanta Humala. The latter was accompanied for
part of the meeting by his candidate for First Vice
President, Gonzalo Garcia.
2. (C) Humala, who assumed a low key and friendly manner
throughout, opened by saying that he wanted to have good
relations with the United States, which he considered an
important partner on issues like coca and biodiversity.
Saying he would speak frankly, Humala voiced concern about
the revelation last week that his U.S. visa had been revoked
— both because it was news to him and because the timing
appeared aimed at influencing the election. Ambassador
Struble reminded the candidate that one of his spokesmen had
publicized the revocation — something that the Embassy would
not have done. The Ambassador gave Humala a copy of the
revocation certificate and explained that we had only
recently become aware Humala did not previously receive the
notice, but reminded the candidate that the Embassy had
repeatedly tried to speak with him about his visa since
learning this January that he might travel to the U.S. The
Ambassador explained that the revocation was prudenial based
upon statements from the time indicating that Ollanta was
involved with his brother,s uprising in Andahuayas during
which several policemen were killed. Simply declaring that
the old visa was valid again, as Humala had insisted, was not
possible; U.S. immigration systems show the old visa as void
and a new one would have to be applied for. Humala observed
that he had never been charged in connection with the
Andahuayas uprising and said that he had only called upon
Peruvians to employ their constitutional right to rebel.
While showing no rancor, he said that he did not plan to
apply for another visa.
3. (C) Ambassador Shapiro said that the United States
intended to work constructively with whoever was elected
President in Peru. The key issue for us was not whether
governments were of the left or the right but rather poverty.
Peru appeared close to making an economic and development
breakthrough; the U.S. sought to promote inclusion of the
poor in economic opportunity. Humala responded that he
likewise did not believe in left/right axis, agreeing the
problem was the poor; he was not part of any bloc, was not
anti-Chilean and was not anti-American. Shifting to new
ground, he said he did believe in the need to revise Peru,s
anti-narcotics approach. Peru should cut off diversion of
precursor chemicals, give priority to interdiction, and
resume its aerial interdiction program.
4. (C) Ambassador Struble said that the principal concern of
the United States was that Peru’s anti-narcotics policy be
viable, meaning that it result in reduced illegal drug
production rather than increases, despite great effort and
expenditure. The Ambassador noted that the situation Peru
faced with coca was not static. Colombia recognized that
coca fed violence in the country and was committed on
national security grounds to eradicate all it could. That
was driving up prices in Peru and Bolivia, and cultivation
was increasing. Ambassador Shapiro observed that experience
showed voluntary eradication did not work without the
incentive of a credible forced eradication program. Humala
said that he would permit forced eradication if alternative
development were offered but refused. He added the
significant condition that the alternative products had to
offer farmers a level of income similar to coca. Humala
repeated the “zero cocaine, not zero coca” slogan his
campaign has borrowed from Bolivia,s Morales. Coca should
be part of the agricultural agenda, he said, saying he would
move the issue from the Ministry of Interior/police to the
Ministry of Agriculture. (Comment: Humala’s understanding
of narcotics trafficking in Peru is very shallow. He was
clearly unaware that only a small portion of cocaine now
moves out of Peru by air and that no licit product grown in
the coca zone commands prices as high as what
narcotraffickers will pay for coca. He did not give the
impression, however, of someone whose policy towards the
coca/cocaine problem would be altered by exposure to the
facts.)
5. (C) Humala next reiterated his concern that the United
States was intervening in Peru,s election. Apart from the
visa issue, he cited the Ambassador’s April meetings with
Lourdes Flores and her campaign team. Ambassador Struble
replied that he had simultaneously requested meetings with
Flores and Humala after the first round of elections; Flores
accepted while Humala had not. Such meetings were customary
diplomatic practice, Struble said, noting that Humala had
himself met with a number of foreign Ambassadors. The
alleged meeting with Flores” campaign team would likewise
have been quite normal, the Ambassador observed, but in fact
that was not what happened * it was a lunch with an old
Peruvian friend and his colleagues, one of whom was a
prominent advisor to Flores. Humala said he wanted all
foreign countries — Venezuela, Argentina and the U.S. — to
avoid actions that could be deemed interference in Peru,s
electoral process. Ambassador Struble replied, “We have our
first agreement * we want the same thing,” holding out his
hand to shake on it — a hand Humala accepted.
6. (C) Asked for his views on Colombia, Humala said that he
recognized the legitimacy of President Uribe and did not want
the Colombian conflict to enter Peru. He was ready to
cooperate with the United States on the matter though he
would always be respectful of Colombian sovereignty. Humala
said that he would reinforce the border; he did not want Peru
to be an R&R zone or logistics base for the FARC.
7. (C) Humala asked whether the US Embassy had a financial
relationship with Human Social Capital (CHS), a consulting
firm headed up by former Minister of Interior Rospigliosi.
The Ambassador said that the Embassy valued the analyses
produced by CHS and was among its clients. Anticipating the
reason for Humala,s question (Rospigliosi is also a
columnist and has been very critical of Humala), the
Ambassador noted that questions sometimes arise as to whether
groups that receive funds from the US Embassy are expressing
our viewpoint. In fact, our assistance partners receive
funds from various sources and usually have broader agendas
than the issue on which we work together. NGOs that receive
US funding have at times publicly criticized U.S. policies.
Humala asked whether he could have a list of NGOs the Embassy
worked with. The Ambassador said that the information was
available on the web. When Humala reiterated that he would
like a list, the Ambassador said he would send something
over.
8. (C) Gonzalo Garcia, in the only intervention he made
during the meeting, said he would like to organize a meeting
between Humala,s economic team and Embassy counterparts.
The Ambassador agreed and promised to follow up.
9. (C) Concluding the meeting, Humala said that his speech
struck many as radical, but that was just because he reveals
how many Peruvians see their situation. He spoke of the
concern many Peruvians have that they do not benefit from
their natural resources, citing the Camisea project, and that
they have been disadvantaged by corrupt deals, citing
Yanacocha. He recalled that the U.S. Congress had recently
blocked an Arab-owned firm from controlling U.S. ports and
said that his concerns about Chilean control of Peruvian
ports was similar — not directed against Chile, but by a
concern that a Chilean operator of Peruvian ports would not
work hard to compete against facilities in Chile.
————
COMMENT:
————
10. (C) This meeting was positive in that it opened a line
of communication and defanged the visa issue, which has now
passed entirely from view. It served to confirm, however,
what we have heard from some of the people within Humala,s
organization who are friendlier towards us — the candidate
looks at us through a very paranoid lens. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE
===================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 205404
date: 5/4/2009 16:16
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————————- header ends ————————
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000637
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH OLLANTA HUMALA
Classified By: Amb. P Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4b and d.
1. (C) Summary: I met one-on-one with Nationalist Party
leader Ollanta Humala April 16 at his request. Across
two-and-a-half hours of discussion, Humala revealed perhaps
more than he intended of his electoral strategy for regional
and congressional elections in 2010 and for presidential
elections in 2011. He is clearly working closely with some
of the most radical groups in Peru, even as he continues to
project a moderate nationalist line on economic,
international, and political issues. Ollanta has also
successfully raised his media profile in recent weeks, in
part by joining a growing national consensus on what should
be done about the VRAE region, where Sendero and drug
traffickers hold sway. I was struck by a growing
self-confidence, a view echoed by at least one other veteran
observer of the political scene. I was also left with the
impression that Ollanta remains ambivalent about fully
abandoning radical alternatives. He is open to suggestions
on international travel and, for at least the third time in
as many discussions over the past ten months, indicated his
interest in visiting the US. We should consider our options
on supporting his travel should he formally make a request.
End Summary.
2. (C) Ollanta was supposed to visit with his wife Nadine
Herrera, international secretary of his party, and reputedly
the radical political brains behind Humala. Her father,
however, is on his deathbed (and died April 24), and the
meeting was one-on-one at the residence. Humala, dressed in
jeans and a polo shirt, was extremely relaxed, and without
the coaxing we have seen previously from his wife, remarkably
open on a number of topics.
Bases, VRAE, and Drugs
———————————
3. (C) An April 9 Sendero Luminoso attack had left 14
soldiers dead in the VRAE. Despite several attacks over the
previous twelve months, this incident sparked a level of
sustained national media and Congressional attention on the
VRAE not seen for years. Ollanta reflected that
preoccupation, and said he saw his opening to speak with some
degree of authority with both myself and the media because of
his past as a military officer fighting Sendero in the
Huancavelica area in the late 1980s.
4. (C) Ollanta first raised his usual concerns about an
American base in Pichari, a report he claimed to have seen of
upcoming joint exercises involving 3,000 Colombians and
Americans in Peru, and the numerous US naval ship visits
planned for 2009. I rebutted Ollanta’s claims in greater
detail than on previous occasions. I did acknowledge the
problems in perception we had encountered during the New
Horizons humanitarian assistance exercises, and Ollanta
pointed out it was difficult for the local population of
Ayacucho (formerly the heart of Sendero) to see military
forces as benign. Locals saw the humanitarian projects as
preparations for establishing a more permanent US presence in
the area. I told Ollanta what he should already should know:
that USG support for infrastructure improvement in Peru was
part of a decades-long tradition of American cooperation with
Peruvian security forces, and that this assistance would
continue.
5. (C) Ollanta dropped the subject, and instead discussed his
efforts to play a constructive role during the week following
the April 9 Sendero attack in Sanabamba. By way of
background, he noted that the VRAE would remain a near
impossible area to control. Virtually all the population (of
200,000) was in some way tied to the drug trade. Efforts to
develop alternative crops would not work given the challenges
of the terrain and the poor infrastructure. The police and
army personnel stationed there were completely corrupted, and
unwilling to engage. Ollanta reprised his call for creating
a $200 million fund to buy the annual coca crop as
alternatives were developed and the government provided
social services and infrastructure. He estimated that this
would be a fraction of the cost of continuing to prosecute a
war in the VRAE. He stated that any efforts to prematurely
eradicate coca production (at almost half Peru’s total) would
not only fail, but radicalize the population. When Ollanta
pressed on his proposal to buy out the coca farmers, I
suggested that this was an idea which had little support, and
presumably for good reasons. I strongly urged Humala to
travel to Vienna and other capitals to develop a firmer
appreciation of how the scourge of trafficking worldwide was
tackled. Humala was receptive, but asked how he could go
about doing so.
6. (C) In recent days, Ollanta had reached out to the
government. He had spoken twice with Prime Minister Yehude
Simon and communicated a proposal to establish a multi-party
commission to oversee development in the VRAE. Ollanta had
proposed one of his supporters to chair the commission,
someone who knew the region and the issues. Ollanta
rationalized that it was he, and not the government, who had
most to lose from this national unity response to the crisis.
If the commission failed to deliver in the VRAE, Humala’s
Nationalist Party image would be damaged nationally. Simon
had expressed interest, but then spoken to President Garcia.
The answer back was “interesting idea”, which Humala
interpreted as a no. He reiterated that he had made the
offer as a patriot: the situation in the VRAE was serious.
7. (C) In explaining his concern, Ollanta noted that recent
human rights abuses claims against him were politically
motivated, and as unlikely to prosper as previous accusations
that he had supported his radical brother Antauro’s coup
attempt a few years ago. The new incident had a woman
claiming that an army commander code-named “Carlos” had
cold-bloodedly killed her son during the first war against
Sendero. The murder had in fact taken place when Ollanta was
no longer assigned to the region as an officer. He discussed
his days as an officer in the field, the importance of
winning hearts and minds, and of Sendero violations he had
witnessed. (In a subsequent appearance on a television news
show, Ollanta expounded at length on the situation in the
VRAE. Much of the time, he sounded remarkably moderate and
concerned.)
Politics
————
8. (C) I asked Humala about the current political scene.
Ollanta indicated his desire to be constructive, but grew
more pointed in his remarks when I asked him about electoral
prospects. He thought the Fujimori trial had hurt Keiko, the
former president’s daughter and standard-bearer. Ollanta
stated he remained a strong candidate for the future, and the
tactics of his opponents and specifically President Garcia
were to ensure Ollanta did not reach the second round of a
presidential election, as he successfully did in 2006.
9. (C) Ollanta had carefully studied the polling on why he
had lost in 2006 (in quite some detail), calculating that the
proliferation of candidates weakened his candidacy. The
emergence of the recently retired (and controversial) army
commander Edwin Donayre as a potential presidential candidate
was a perfect example. “Someone is behind him”, because
Donayre would never be a serious candidate. Ollanta did
testily acknowledge Donayre could draw off votes that would
otherwise go to the Nationalist candidate. When I ventured
to suggest, on the basis of my numerous contacts with Donayre
over the previous year, that the general had the common
touch, Humala was dismissive. He said that the apparent
affection soldiers exhibited for Donayre, was very much a
product of military hierarchy. Enlisted men took their cue
from the behavior of their commanders, and responded
accordingly. Donayre was in fact a “clown,” with little to
offer, and a simplistic populist message. (Note: Donayre is
virulently anti-Chilean, a Quechua speaker, and rails against
privilege. End Note.) Humala also mentioned that on the
left, NGOs and others had sought to encourage the leftist
activist priest Father Marco Arana to run, convincing the
latter he could have national appeal, but this was a forlorn
exercise. (Note: Arana is based in Cajamarca in the north,
and his primary platform is fighting mining investments,
especially foreign companies, in the name of impoverished
local populations and the environment. In a May 4 interview,
he answered questions likening him to Paraguayan President
Lugo. End Note.)
10. (C) I spoke about the global economic crisis, the impact
on Peru, and suggested there seemed to be a general
international consensus on how to respond. I added that
Presidents Chavez and Morales were rather isolated in railing
against measures that even Russia and China were prepared to
support. Humala said that just because he saw himself in the
leftist international bloc did not mean he agreed with
everything his regional allies said or did.
11. (C) This led to a discussion about how Humala interacted
with his party and Congress. Humala noted that he had only
gone to Congress two or three times since losing the
presidential election. He managed his Nationalist Party
congresspersons directly, however. When they were first
elected in 2006, he had had to be a “military general” in
order to forge a common voice. He met with the caucus
weekly, and it was not a simple task: mixing professional
lawyers with indigenous representatives was a challenge.
They would sit at different ends of the table. As things
gelled, he relied on more informal mechanisms, but he stayed
on top of whatever was happening in Congress.
12. (C) I asked about how the Nationalist Party dealt with
more radical political groupings in Peru. Ollanta, without
hesitating, responded that he dealt with them directly. In
fact, two days previously he had met in Lima with far-left
labor leader (Mario Huaman), and the leaders of Patria Roja
(Alberto Moreno) and the MNI. They had discussed the
strategy for the 2010 regional and local elections. I
expressed surprise, and asked how this coalition-building
squared with the more moderate image Ollanta was trying to
project. After correcting me by noting he was moderate on
national political and economic issues, Humala said he was
the one in the driver’s seat. He was the one with political
legitimacy; he was the one with leadership capability; he was
the one with a national program. The other actors had none
of the above. Moreno had won less than a quarter of one
percent of the national vote in 2006. Moreover, these
groupings were riven by internal dissent and looking to use
political power to secure positions. (Note: The implication
was that they had lost their way. End Note.) Most
critically, they did not understand that the key raison
d’etre for a political party was winning power. Everything
else flowed from winning elections.
13. (C) I asked what this motley coalition of radicals did
for a coherent national message, and mobilization of support.
Humala indicated that these groups were already active in
radicalizing populations, and it was, in effect, better to
have them inside the tent rather than outside. He discussed
their potential role in places like Pasco, Junin, Cajamarca,
and in the south. He also sought to help them where
appropriate: a group representing workers in the sierra had
been in touch asking for money to help their members stay
afloat in a deteriorating economic situation. When it came
to the national platform, however, it was he and the
Nationalist Party that would decide what policies were.
Humala had no doubt he could control the messaging of the
coaition.
14. (C) I closed by noting that working with radicals
nonetheless had implications, and would not be appealing to
the wider political spectrum Humala sought to attract.
Humala surprisingly took this on board and said he would take
a closer look at what Patria Roja was doing in Lima. (Note:
Our indications are that Patria Roja and Sendero are looking
to work in universities again. End Note.)
International and Travel
————————————
15. (C) Humala asked me what he thought about recent changes
in Cuba. I responded that it appeared that Raul Castro was
tightening his grip, possibly for change in the future.
Humala commented that Cuba’s was an “extremely hermetic”
government. He thought the dismissal of Perez Roque and Lage
had been handled in a rough fashion. He added that there
were a number of people below their level who had also been
dismissed summarily, and regretted it. (Note: It was hard to
read where Ollanta was taking this point. End Note.)
16. (C) In addition to asking about how to go about
arranging travel to UN offices and Europe (I suggested
Ollanta talk to relevant diplomatic missions), Humala made a
strong pitch for travel to the US. He did not have a date in
mind but wanted to be sure that if and when he applied for a
visa he would not be embarrassed (by a turndown, presumably).
I promised to look into the possibility at the right time.
Ollanta also asked how he could be in touch with the
Democratic Party. His request was inchoate but repeated: he
wanted to have contact with the party in the context of
developing transparent relations with the United States. He
also repeated previous assurances that he wanted to maintain
open channels with the mission in Lima.
MCKINLEY
===================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 159839
date: 6/26/2008 21:33
refid: 08LIMA1107
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08LIMA1081
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————————- header ends ————————
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001107
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018
TAGS:PGOV, PREL, PINR, PE
SUBJECT: OLLANTA HUMALA CLAIMS HE CAN SAVE PERU FROM
EXTREMISTS
REF: LIMA 1081
Classified By: Amb. P Michael McKinley for reasons 1.b and d.
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador McKinley met with opposition
Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) leader Ollanta Humala and
his wife (and advisor) Nadine Heredia June 18 for a cordial
two-hour discussion. Humala argued that the Garcia
government is neglecting Peru’s mounting social concerns and
needs to find pragmatic solutions to prevent the spread of
conflict. He said the recent protests in Moquegua over the
allocation of mining royalties (canon) broke out after the
government first ignored the problem and then lost control.
Humala called for “pragmatic” solutions to mounting social
conflicts in the mining sector and proposed to increase taxes
on mining profits and to improve mining canon distribution
among regions. Asked about the possible impact on juridical
security and investment, Ollanta said companies have no
security if social conflicts can shut down production.
Humala claimed to favor free trade but lamented the irony
that the US Congress had done more to protect Peru’s labor
and environmental norms in the FTA framework than had Peru’s
own Congress. Turning to constitutional reform, Ollanta said
the 1993 Constitution was illegitimate and called for the
return of the 1979 Constitution. Ambassador McKinley closed
the conversation by addressing Humala’s concerns about the
New Horizons military-humanitarian mission currently in
progress in Ayacucho. On June 25th, the Ambassador saw
Humala again at a diplomatic function, and Humala endorsed
the Ambassador’s upcoming trip to Ayacucho to explain New
Horizons to a skeptical audience, although he made clear that
he stuck to his concerns. End Summary.
Cordial Atmospherics
——————————
2. (C) Ambassador McKinley received opposition Peruvian
Nationalist Party (PNP) leader Ollanta Humala and his wife
Nadine Heredia at his residence on June 18th for a cordial
and broad-ranging two-hour conversation. Ollanta sat relaxed
and attentive throughout, making his points in a calm,
non-confrontational tone. Nadine — the PNP’s Secretary for
International Relations and effectively Ollanta’s “Chief of
Staff” and principal political advisor — sat on the edge of
her seat with a serious and guarded facial expression at
first, intermittently joining the discussion to clarify
Ollanta’s comments. She let down her guard and warmed as the
discussion drew to a close.
Humala: I Can Save Peru From Radicalism
———————————————————-
3. (C) Humala argued throughout the conversation that Alan
Garcia’s government is neglecting Peru’s mounting social
concerns and that, absent pragmatic solutions, regional
conflicts like the recent violent protests in Moquegua region
would spread. Ollanta expressed concern about this prospect
and warned that dangerous, anti-systemic radicals could
ultimately threaten the stability of the state. Declaring
himself “a nationalist, not a leftist”, Humala said that he
represents the pragmatic change that Peru needs. (Comment:
Humala did not mention credible reports that he often seeks
to stir up, for political gain, the very social conflict he
told us he wants to prevent. End Comment.)
Conflict in Moquegua Region
—————————————-
4. (C) Humala cited the recent conflict in Moquegua over
regional mining canon allocations to underscore his general
thesis on the government’s neglect of social problems.
Moquegua’s leadership, he said, had repeatedly presented
their complaints to the government during the previous year
but received no response. The government finally paid
attention after the first week of protests when roadblocks
began to cause shortages in neighboring Tacna region. He
warned that Moquegua’s elected leaders had lost credibility
with the local populace because of their inability to win
concessions from Lima, leading to the emergence of more
radical “informal” leaders. This complicated negotiating a
definitive end to the conflict because it was unclear with
whom the GOP could successfully negotiate, creating a messy
situation that could replicate itself in other regions.
(Note: The GOP eventually resolved the Moquegua conflict by
offering concessions to the protestors. End Note)
Raise Mining Profit Taxes
————————————-
5. (C) Humala said the best way to avert conflict was to
increase mandatory profit sharing (utilidades) by mining
companies that are making bundles right now with mineral
prices sky high and to spread the benefits of the windfall
widely — to workers, communities, the regions and the whole
country. Recent congressional negotiations on a bill that
would raise the cap on mining profits taken by mine workers
did not resolve the underlying structural problem, he said.
It rewarded only a narrow band of full-time formal mining
workers, not the majority subcontracted workers and others,
and therefore exacerbated the differences between them.
Moreover, in rewarding full-time mining employees, it took
money away from the regions. Mining companies agreed with
this solution because they care narrowly about their own
workers, he said, but the government needed to concern itself
with the broader interests of all. In this sense, the
government would need to mediate among the competing
interests of the workers, the mining regions, and the
Peruvian people, which he repeated would require raising the
profit taxes on these companies. (Comment: In this and other
instances, Humala cast himself in the role of impartial
statesman rather than rabble-rousing opposition leader. End
Comment.)
Juridical Security, Foreign Investment, Free Trade
——————————————————————- ——-
6. (C) The Ambassador responded to Ollanta’s mining sector
proposals by emphasizing the importance of juridical security
to attract foreign investment. Humala acknowledged the
importance of juridical security and foreign investment, and
raised the example of the Melia Hotel chain in Cuba. He said
he once asked the chain’s Cuba manager why they had so many
hotels on the island, and the manager responded that they
felt safe because they knew that Cuba’s laws never change.
(Note: We shared a laugh at the irony. End Note.) Humala
then argued that companies in Peru today only enjoy juridical
security on paper. What good are legal norms if social
conflicts halt production? He insisted that if the
government followed his model, juridical security would in
fact be more sustainable.
7. (C) Ambassador McKinley raised the importance of free
trade to Peru’s future. Countries throughout the world are
competing for investment and markets in a process that cannot
be stopped and that far transcends commercial relations
between Peru and the U.S., he said. Peru can either stand
aside and watch or jump in and benefit. Arguing that he is
not a leftist, Humala accepted the importance of trade but
said it more important that it be “equitable” than free. As
far as the bilateral free trade agreement went, he said that
Peru would never be able compete with the U.S. in a host of
areas and feared that Peru’s potential to develop critical
national industries would be undermined as a result. Both
agreed to disagree on this issue. Humala continued by
pointing out that FTA conventions on labor and the
environment, which were generally positive, had been inserted
thanks to pressure by the US Congress. It was ironic, he
noted, that the U.S. congress had done more to represent the
interests of Peruvian workers and the environment in this
case than had Peru’s own congress or government.
Constitutional Reform
——————————-
8. (C) Turning to constitutional reform — a topic recently
debated in Congress (Ref A) — Ollanta claimed that the 1993
Constitution lacked legitimacy because it was written by
Fujimori-era criminals and approved in a referendum marked by
fraud. Humala said the piecemeal reforms proposed and
rejected in Congress last week will not suffice and that his
party proposed returning to the 1979 Constitution. He said
he was calling for a referendum on the 1979 Constitution
because the public supports such a change, and observed that
the debate over the constitution had caused serious fractures
in Congress and within the ruling APRA party itself. Humala
said he will continue pushing the issue and accused the
President of reneging on his campaign promise to return to
the 1979 document. (Note: According the recent polls, fewer
than 20% of Peruvians favor a return to the 1979
Constitution. End Note.)
New Horizons
——————
9. (C) The Ambassador and Humala closed with an in depth
discussion of the New Horizons bilateral
military-humanitarian mission currently underway in Ayacucho
region. (Note: The Humala-funded La Primera newpaper and
several PNP Congresspeople have been harshly critical of the
project and have accused the USG of planning to establish a
military base to replace the Manta FOL. End Note) The
Ambassador explained that the three-month mission would has
primarily humanitarian goals — performing surgeries,
building schools, digging wells — and that at the end, US
troops will all return home. He emphasized that it was a
bilateral exercise, that everything had been closely
coordinated with and vetted by the GOP, and that the Peruvian
military and police had lead responsibility for force
protection and security. Contrary to some inflammatory media
reports, he said, US weapons were being warehoused under lock
and key.
10. (C) Humala then asked a series of pointed questions about
the exercise: Why did participating doctors and engineers
have to be uniformed military rather than civilians? The
Ambassador responded that the mission was also intended to
support the training of Peruvian and U.S. military personnel
to deal with natural and other disasters, a capability which
other organizations lacked. Why was the mission located on
the edge of a narcotics-producing region in a sensitive zone
of historical conflict — and what would the US do if an
American soldier or a Peruvian civilian was accidentally
injured or killed? The Ambassador responded that we believed
in the Peruvian government’s ability to provide security and
were working carefully to ensure the safety of Americans and
Peruvians alike. Humala then noted the imminent closing of
the Manta FOL in Ecuador (claiming that President Correa had
told him the decision was definitive), and asked about U.S.
intentions to establish a successor to Manta somewhere in
Peru. Citing historical examples, the Ambassador noted that
the potential closing of the Manta FOL does not mean we
necessarily must open a new base in some other country, and
reiterated that the U.S. has no intention to establish a base
in Peru.
Comment: A Positive Meeting
—————————————-
11. (C) Although we probably did not change Humala’s opinions
on the key issues, the dialogue was cordial and a level of
trust was built. In comments to the press while traveling in
Ayacucho later that week that faithfully reflected the spirit
and content of the exchange, Humala stated that, although
there was reason for concern about New Horizons, the U.S.
Ambassador had promised him that US troops were in Ayacucho
temporarily and would return to the U.S. when the exercise
ended. Ambassador McKinley saw Humala again at a diplomatic
function on June 25th, and in a friendly conversation Humala
endorsed the Ambassador’s upcoming trip to Ayacucho to
explain New Horizons to a skeptical public. Humala also
mentioned that he had met and posed for photographs with an
independent American missionary/medical team in the area.
Humala added that one focus of protests in Ayacucho on July
8th – 9th —part of a broader national strike — would be the
presence of US troops. (Note: We have asked New Horizons to
stand down on July 8-9 as a precaution. End Note.)
MCKINLEY
===================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 144228
date: 3/4/2008 17:59
refid: 08LIMA389
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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————————- header ends ————————
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000389
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PE
SUBJECT: RADICALS HIJACK CUSCO PROTESTS; CITY LOSES APEC
EVENT
Classified By: POL/C ALEXIS LUDWIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
1. (C) Summary: Radical union and student leaders recently
led a strike to protest a law that would facilitate private
investment in tourist services at archeological sites,
effectively shutting down the city of Cusco February 21-22.
Residents of Cusco broadly rejected the law and said it
favored deep-pocketed investors and tourists over poorer
local residents, but accepted changes made by Congress to
give Regional Presidents flexibility in implementation.
Radicals who sought to exploit public sentiments for
political gain have clear ties to Peruvian Nationalist Party
(PNP) leader Ollanta Humala, the communist Patria Roja party,
and (in some cases) Venezuela-sponsored ALBA houses.
Humala’s own role was indirect (via proxies), and most local
analysts said Venezuela was not behind the protests (the GOP
disagrees). The intensity of the strike and the prospect of
another one soon — part of a larger dynamic of radical
actions seeking to incite instability during Peru’s year of
summits — led the government to move the scheduled April
APEC event from Cusco to another location. End Summary.
A Month of Protests: Timeline of Events
———————————————————-
2. (C) The February 21 to 22 general strike that shut down
commerce and movement in Cusco was the culmination of a
series of protests launched to oppose a law passed by
Congress in December 2007 (Law 29164) to facilitate private
investment in tourist services for archeological sites.
About five thousand university students on January 16 led the
first protest, which was reportedly handled poorly by local
police. Regional government and civic leaders saw the
political value of the first protest and called a general
march on January 23 that attracted some 20-50 thousand locals
to a peaceful rally and series of speeches. Regional leaders
followed these marches with a general strike on February 7th
that attracted fewer people but slowed activity in the city;
local observers described that strike as peaceful and
festive. To preempt further protest, Congress agreed to
modify Law 29164 to allow Regional Presidents to decide, at
their discretion, whether or how to implement the law in
their regions. Cusco’s Regional President welcomed this
change and called for dialogue with the central government.
Several local contacts argued that the modifications were not
perfect but hat no further strikes could be justified.
3. (C) Just as it seemed the protest would fade, a group of
radical union and student leaders hijacked the movement and
called for a two-day stoppage of commerce and traffic in the
region on February 21-22. Radical leaders had been planning
this strike for at least two weeks and had discussed
attempting to storm the airport on February 9, according to
internet documents. Although local sources say only about
3,000 people participated in this strike — some reportedly
under threat of fine by union leaders — observers described
a surprisingly intense and effective shutdown of the city and
surrounding region. Taxis and shops that tried to do
business were attacked with rocks; roads were blocked with
boulders; trains from Cusco to Machu Picchu were cancelled;
and a minor assault on the airport was turned back. Local
observers added that while one-day strikes are common in
Cusco, two-day strikes are unprecedented.
Cusco Residents Reject Law for Discriminating against Locals
——————————————————————- ———————-
4. (C) Cusco residents rejected the archeological law for a
variety of reasons. Many locals say they fear the law would
exacerbate the over-commercialization of the region’s
historical patrimony that is creating a society that is
deeply stratified between tourists and locals. Several
pointed out to poloff that, while tourists have access to the
best services the city offers, dark-skinned locals are turned
away at the door; archeological sites that locals once
entered freely are now off limits to everyone but the
wealthy. Several embassy contacts argued that the real
purpose of the law was to enrich people tied to former
President Toledo — whose party proposed the bill —
including his wife and vice president, who have purchased
tracts of land near a significant yet underdeveloped Cusco
archeological site. Many others opposed the law based on
misinformation: embassy contacts reported that local
journalists interviewed protestors who said they were
fighting to prevent America from buying Machu Picchu. More
rationally, the Regional President’s General Manager told
poloff that Cusco’s grievances would have surely been
addressed if Congress had followed the normal process of
consultation with the regions before passing the bill.
Radicals Co-opt and Manipulate Grievances
————————————————————-
5. (C) Just as it seemed the wind would go from the sails of
the protests, a variety of radical local leaders effectively
manipulated Cusco’s grievances for political gain. The
following is a brief sketch of key protest leaders and their
established links to groups such as the communist Patria Roja
party, nationalist opposition leader Ollanta Humala and his
Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP), and (in at least one case)
Venezuela-sponsored ALBA houses:
rebuild influence through union leadership.
c) Cristian Quispe Montanez: Publicly linked to Yepez and Dolmos during the strikes, Quispe is a key student organizer and president of the Cusco University Federation. The head of security for Cusco’s rail system told poloff that Quispe is a known member of Patria Roja and an important player in the group’s efforts to rebuild support at Cusco’s universities. d) Tito Lenes Sihua: Lenes is Secretary General of the Civil Construction union, which along with student groups led the failed assault on Cusco’s airport. Cusco’s human rights Ombudsman described Lenes as a dangerous and erratic radical who will sit down to negotiate one day, then attack the next. e) Hugo Blanco: Blanco is an unaffiliated radical leader that led the effort to block roads in Anta Province outside Cusco city, according to local contacts. Blanco is a prominent anti-systemic actor who was jailed for leading an indigenous insurgency in Cusco in the 1960s. He now publishes a newspaper called “La Lucha Indigena” (The Indigenous Battle). f) Julian Incarroca: Incarroca is director of the ALBA house located in Cusco’s San Sebastian district, according to two local sources, and is described on the ALBA website as the local government representative for the Cusco ALBA House Delegation. His involvement in the protests is unclear, but he attended at least one planning meeting, according to a Nationalist Party contact.Ollanta Humala’s Role in the Protests
——————————————————-
6. (C) Our contacts in Cusco agreed that Ollanta Humala
probably did not have a direct role in organizing the strikes
but instead allowed independent proxies to foment unrest on
his behalf. Humala himself told a press conference on
February 22 that he is not “behind the protests, but rather
in front of them.” (Comment: We take this to mean he played
no role in organizing the protests but has sought actively to
associate himself publicly with them during and after the
fact. End Comment.) Humala in July 2007 told poloffs his
strategy is to make common cause with protest groups and
leftist movements around the country in order to form a
united political front to contest the 2011 election. One
Humala associate, Miguel Angel de la Puente, says Ollanta has
already formed political alliances with various social
movement leaders. In return for their launching protests to
undermine the government, Ollanta has promised these leaders
positions on his next campaign slate. Several contacts in
Cusco believe this explains the relationship between Ollanta
and Javier Yepez, who has invited Humala to speak at protests
twice in the past four months. This also explains Ollanta’s
relationship with Patria Roja. One well-informed source told
us that Ollanta and Patria Roja leader Alberto Moreno had met
clandestinely in 2006 to form such an alliance, and claimed
to have photos as proof. (Note: We have not seen the photos.
End Note.) De la Puente adds that Ollanta is particularly
interested in coordinating protests in the run-up to the
international summits planned for May and November.
Venezuela and the ALBA Houses
——————————————-
7. (C) Contacts in Cusco believe broadly that ALBA houses in
Cusco have no discernible role in the protests and are only
indirectly linked with certain protest leaders. Local
sources told poloff there are as many as three ALBA houses
located in the districts of San Sebastian, San Jeronimo, and
Sicuani, but described them as little more than coordinating
offices for the Venezuelan-sponsored “Mision Milagro”
(Miracle Mission) program to provide eye surgeries to poor
people. The role of the Cusco ALBA houses is to arrange for
patients to be transferred to Venezuela or to the ALBA house
in Copacabana, Bolivia for treatment, they said. (One source
said his cousin had received eye surgery in Copacabana.) The
Regional President’s General Manager argued that the problem
with ALBA houses is not that they threaten the government by
spreading unrest but that have been established informally
without a government-to-government accord. In that sense,
local sources suggested that there was no direct involvement
of Venezuela or Venezuelan representatives in the protests.
One PNP congressional advisor says his Venezuelan Embassy
contacts are more interested in promoting the Bolivarian
Continental Coordinator (CCB) organization than the ALBA
houses. (Note: The GOP appears to disagree with the local
assessment minimizing the role of Alba Houses in the recent
protests. Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo and Interior
Minister Luis Alva Castro have publicly accused Alba Houses
of seeking to foment instability in Peru, and claim to have
documents to prove it. End Note.)
Cusco Protests: Part of A Broader Anti-Summit Dynamic
——————————————————————- ————
8. (C) While protests in the Andes are widespread and common,
the intensity of the recent Cusco strike took many by
surprise. That its radical leaders were unfazed by changes
to the law removing rational cause for further protest and
apparently emboldened by a separate “nationwide” agricultural
strike that caused the death of several people in Ayacucho,
suggests the Cusco strike was part of a broader dynamic of
disruption. Anti-systemic leaders, including Ollanta Humala,
have publicly stated their plans to organize anti-summits
parallel to the scheduled EU-Latin America meeting in May and
the culminating APEC leaders” conference in November. More
broadly, there have been reports of radicals” plans to incite
instability and undermine the government’s image in the
run-up to these events (septel). In response to the Cusco
strike and to protest radical leaders” stated plans to launch
another one at some future date, the government announced
that the April APEC Tourism Ministerial would be switched
from Cusco to another location (probably Lima). Conscious of
the more general threat, government officials have privately
and publicly emphasized that ensuring the security of the
country and the safety of visiting delegations during Peru’s
year of international summits is the highest government
priority.
NEALON
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